Consensus Knowledge Acquisition by Trice, Andrew & Davis, Randall
--- ---lctl
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE LABORATORY
A.I. Memo No. 1183 December 1989
Consensus Knowledge Acquisition
Andrew Trice
Randall Davis
Abstract
We have developed a method and prototype program for assisting two
experts 'in their attempts to construct a single, consensus knowledge
base. We show that consensus building can be effectively facilitated by
a debugging approach that 'Identifies, explains, and resolves discrepan-
cles in their knowledge. To implement this approach we dentify and
use recognition and repair procedures for a variety of discrepancies. Ex-
amples of this knowledge are 'Illustrated with sample transcripts from
CARTER, a system for reconciling two rule-based systems. Implications
for resolving other kinds of knowledge representations are also exam-
ined.
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1 INTROD UCTION I
1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a curious ontradiction in the current state of practice of knowledge'acqui-
sition: At a time when the view 'is wdely shared that knowledge in organizations is
distributed among multiple experts, and information systems are seen as an effective
way to coordinate the activities of groups, common practice in knowledge acquisi-
tion still focuses on acquiring the knowledge of a single individual. Research in both
artificial intelligence (Davis,, 1982; Mittal and Dym, 1985) and nformation systems
(Fellers, 1987; Fedorowicz and Manheim, 1986; Mumford, 1987) has identified this
gap as a major barrier to the development of more powerful knowledge systems.
Until now, expert system developers have dealt wth this difficulty either by re-
fraining from building multi-expert systems entirely; by appointing one of the experts
as "knowledge czar," thereby giving him the final word in any dispute; or merely by
requiring experts to achieve consensus on their own, without any systematic assis-
tance. Multi-expert acquisition techniques that have been proposed to date have
tended to be ether very restrictive mathematical formulations (Gaglio et al., 1985),
adaptations of established group decision-making techniques (Jagannathan and El-
maghraby, 1985), or methods that focus on smply using knowledge from multiple
sources rather than finding and resolving the conflicts and 'inconsistencies 'in that
knowledge.
We call a process by which multiple experts attempt to construct a single consen-
sus knowledge base "consensus knowledge acquisition" (CKA). The objective of our
research 'is to develop ideas.and tools to facilitate this activity. Specifically, we have
drawn on and extended work in artificial intelligence, information systems design, and
negotiation, to create a debugging system capable of aiding two (or more) experts in
ex ing, an iscrepancies
systematically dentifying, plain' d resolving d in their knowledge.
We begin discussion of the issues by outlining several approaches to acquiring
and using multiple bodies of expertise. We then argue for an approach focused on
debugging and present a set of ideas in this vein. We describe the mechanisms we have
developed for detecting and reconciling knowledge base discrepancies, illustrating
these procedures wth sample transcripts from our prototype system. Finally, we
calibrate the contribution of our work and suggest promising future directions.
2 HO'XV CANVVE HANDLE MULTIPLE EXPERTS?
The problem of reconciling multiple points of view has been an 'issue of study for some
time in areas as widespread as group decision making, mathematical psychology, and
management science. One interesting way to view these disparate approaches 'is to
categorize them according to whether they are descriptive or normative, and where
they focus their efforts at consensus: on outcome, process, or knowledge.
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2.1 Descriptive Approaches
Descriptive approaches to this problem are fundamentally concerned wth under-
standing how groups of decision makers actually behave when required to produce
a single answer. Behavior has been studied in both field settings (e.g. Janis, 1982)
and various controlled laboratory conditions (e.g. Davis, 1980; Hammond, 1975) A
commonly observed phenomenon is the existence of psychological barriers to effective
decision-making: factors such as conformity pressure, shyness, unequal distribution
of power, and others can all affect both the process of coming to a decision and the
quality of the decision that results.
2.2 Outcome Combination Methods
Work aimed at combining outcomes is illustrated by 'Ideas like voting (Miner, 1984)
averaging (Aczel and Saaty, 1983), and decomposition and re-synthesis (Brehmer and
Hagafors, 1986). The objective is to arrive at a decision which, while not necessarily
reflecting a consensus of the experts, 'is still better than any single expert could have
arrived at alone.
These methods are largely normative - concentrating on how judgments ought
to be combined rather than on what typically happens in groups, and are focused on
outcome - 'it is the experts' final recommendations that are combined.
The effectiveness of these methods depends on the validity of their assumptions
about both the nature of the outcome and the skill mix of the experts., Nature of
the outcome matters because, for example, voting is appropriate when the scale of
outcome values 'is nominal, while averaging is suitable when it 'is a ratio. Assumptions
about skill mix are crucial because averaging makes no sense unless expert errors are
distributed randomly, while decomposition and resynthesis assumes that they vary
systematically across subproblems (i.e., experts have different sub-specialties).
The fundamental problem with these methods is their focus on outcome rather
on than the reasoning used to determine it. We believe it is premature to combine
results before even attempting to achieve consensus on the underlying knowledge
used to arrive at those results. Exploring that knowledge may reveal key derences
in reasoning, vocabulary, or problem assumptions which, once reconciled, remove the
outcome discrepancy entirely. There are also ownership 'issues to consider: If we
combine results wthout allowing discussion of the underlying rationale, the experts
are more likely to be unhappy with or unwilling to take responsibility for the result.
These methods may prove useful in cases where experts have discussed the ra-
tionales and still cannot reach agreement, or in situations where the knowledge bases
exist but the experts responsible for them are unavailable.
2.3 Argumentation
A second approach, argumentation methods, centers on helping people make ex-
plicit the logical structure of their positions. Structured frameworks for analyzing
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arguments (Toulmin, 1958; Fogelin, 1982), for 'Instance, enable dfferent parties 'in a
debate to cooperate in constructing and mak' cise the arguments for and against
a particular assertion. These ideas have recently been embodied 'in computer-based
tools (e.g., Smolensky et al., 1987; Stefil et al., 1987; Lowe, 1985; Nunnamaker et al.,
1988) that ad users in constructing and manipulating the arguments, and sometimes
offer spreadsheet-like capabilities that facilitate exploring the impact of changing an
assumption.
These tools are normative in their approach to consensus building and almost
entirely process oriented: they assist experts in the process of deliberating and de-
bating, but, importantly, do not suggest resolutions to inconsistencies. As such they
introduce an element of rgor 'Into the deliberation process, but offer lttle guidance
in resolving differences between the experts.
2.4 Debugging the Knowledge
We do not want to focus on outcome alone, because we believe that the fundamental
task is to reach consensus on the knowledge itself: differences in outcome may simply
be symptoms of a disagreement about what to know. In that case dealing with
outcome 'is treating the symptoms rather than the cause, while dealing with the
differences in knowledge solves the root problem and may eliminate all the symptoms.
We choose not to focus on formal argumentation in the belief that the knowledge
representation in use - in this case rules - provides sufficient basic structure to the
discussion.
Instead we seek to assist the experts in detecting, deliberating over and recon-
ciling dscrepancies between them. Our approach is normative and focused on the
underlying knowledge used by each expert: we want to understand how experts ought
to come to agreement and we want that agreement to be about the thing we consider
to be fundamental to this undertaking - the knowledge used to make the decisions.
Debugging 'is a technique well suited to our goals because it centers on the detec-
tion explanation and repair of dfects in symbolic systems. As a result we use the
phrase debugging" the knowledge to characterize both the focus of our efforts and
the primary technique we employ.
3 SOME USEFUL IDEAS
Given this 'Pers'pective, three research areas provide relevant concepts. Artificial 'Intel-
ligence (Al) offers the literature on knowledge-based systems and a body of work on
debugging- information systems provides general guidelines for synthesizing multiple
points of view; while work in negotiation and conflict resolution suggests the role of
a third party facilitator.
From Al we exploit the notion that the knowledge representation 'in use can assist
consensus-building by providing a structure and vocabulary for comparing arguments
and the knowledge on which they are based. ne familiar example 'is the explanation
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facility provided by rule-based systems (Davis et al., 1977). These allow a user to
trace the steps the program followed in reaching a particular conclusion, providing
a representation of the argument a domain expert would put forward-'in support of
his recommendation. This provides a concrete and specific focus to the discussion.
The differences between two such reasoning chains can then be described using the
vocabulary provided by the representation, in this case the notion of if/then rules,
attrl'bute-ob'ect-value triples, strengths of certainty, etc. This helps to establish the
agenda for discussion between the two experts.
Program debugging research takes this 'Idea a step further. Many debugging
systems (Brown and Burton, 1978, Kuper, 1989) have developed bug taxonomies
that specify the kinds of things that can go wrong, the probable causes underlying
them, and the corresponding repairs. A key idea here 'is that knowledge about the
program being debugged can 'Itself be used to help guide the repair. Davis 1979),
for example, used knowledge about knowledge base structure to support 'Individual
knowledge acquisition. Our research can be vewed as the extension of this work to
the multiple expert case.
From information systems design we adapt methodologies used to resolve con-
flicting points of view (e.g., Mumford, 1987- Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Hammond et
al., 1984). These methodologies advocate, first, full and active participation from all
involved parties. This suggests that we should structure the CKA process so that
the two experts are likely to have equal influence on design decisions. Second both
adversarial and conciliatory activities are needed to maximize the validity of the fi-
nal design (Henderson, 1987). This implies that we require tools both for enabling
experts to understand how they der and for suggesting ways to resolve their con-
flicts. ThirdIit 'is more effective to focus expert discussion on decision criteria rather
than on outcomes (Hammond et al., 1984). This has helped encourage our focus
on knowledge rather than process. Fnally, the resulting consensus system must be
based on a foundation of commonly understood terms, because agreement on the
higher-level behavior of the system critically depends on this mutual understanding:
If the basic vocabulary differs, the two participants are speaking different, possibly
incommensurate languages.
From negotiation, we use the metaphor of the third party mediator. A program
for facilitating CKA can be thought of as a facilitator whose job is to aid in resolving
discrepancies between two experts. Although CKA is somewhat different from a
traditional negotiation stuation, there is still a useful resemblance. Frst, negotiation
gives us a vocabulary for characterizing the range of roles a CKA program attempts
to fill (e.g., "nonbinding arbitrator", "process consultant"). Second, it can help us
understand the probable consequenc es of various discrepancy resolution strategies.
For instance, if mediators attempt to resolve easy issues before hard ones, they may
create a cooperative climate between t he parties, but rsk alienating parties who view
discussing trivial issues as a waste of time (Rubin, 1981).
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4 BOUNDING THE PROBLEM
We make several assumptions to help bound the task we take on here. First, we
assume the expertise to be reconciled 'is homogeneous in the sense that both experts
are capable of solving the entire problem. This enables us to focus on resolving
discrepancies rather than combining knowledge from dstinct fields.
A second, related assumption of our approach is that the experts already have a
shared frame of reference, some basic set of assumptions in common. Wthout that,
determining where they agree and disagree would be difficult, not only for our system,
but for any human attempting the task.
Third, we assume the experts have constructed individual knowledge bases (KBs)
prior to the start of the process. This ensures that the experts can explain the rea-
soning they used to arrive at their answers and that that reasoning can be adequately
captured by a known reasoning process. This in turn allows us to focus on debug-
ging the knowledge - detecting and resolving differences - rather than knowledge
acquisition.
Fourth, experts involved in CKA are assumed to have equal 'Influence on the
process. The intent is that the content of the consensus KB be determined by rational
deliberation rather than political or organizational factors. A related assumption
is that any conflict between the experts arises from dsagreements about facts and
judgments rather than from conflicting 'Interests, as in a bargaining stuation.
Finally, as simplifying assumptions at the outset we consider only rule-based
representations of knowledge, and only two experts, as a way of providing a foundation
for our initial efforts.
Two other'points will help to set the context for our work. First, it is a fundamen-
tal premise of the work that a consensus KB can perform better than an individual
expert's KB. Our hypothesis 'is that unearthing and resolving differences between two
experts will be fundamentally synergistic, removing limitations and defects in both of
their KBs. This is plausible but of course not guaranteed: some consensus knowledge
bases may not be as good as either of the originals.
Second our point of vew is normative rather than descriptive unlike much of
the work in group decision making, which attempts to describe the complex set of
psychological phenomena that occur in such settings (e.g., Janis, 1982). Rather than
asking what does happen when groups of experts 'Interact, we ask how two experts
should behave to maximize the benefit from collaboration. This is 'Illustrated 'in
part by our assumption above that the multiple experts have equal influence on the
process. As with any normative group decision making process, we look for ways
of proceeding that attenuate the psychological barriers. We believe that focusing
discussion on repairing spocific discrepancies in knowledge is one useful mechanism
for achieving this.
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We are developing a prototype system for facilitating CKA, dubbed CARTER (Conffict
AnalyzeR for Targeted Expert Resolution). The system plays the role of a non-
binding arbitrator mediating between two experts (Figure 1).
CARTER examines each expert's KB, looking for matches and conflicts between
them, deciding which discrepancy to try to resolve, and suggesting possible resolu-
tions. The two experts discuss the suggested resolution and can choose to update
their KBs as suggested, update them in some other manner, or not update them
at all. Whatever the decision, the agreed-upon knowledge 'is added to the third,
consensus knowledge base. The experts' KBs are then analyzed anew, with the cycle
repeating until those two agree exactly, or no further areas of consensus can be found.
In practice, the process is slightly more complex than this, but this gives a sense of
the basic structure. We use transcripts of CARTER 'in operation to illustrate some of
our discrepancy resolution techniques.
identify discrepancies
suggest resolutions
I-
FIGURE 
CARTER Scenario
Expert 2
confer
p
KB 1I-- -.-i
update KB's
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5.1 USING DISCREPANCY KNOWLEDG
Our initial efforts at CKA focus on information derived from the KBs themselves:
CARTER examines the two KBs to detect discrepancies and to determine how they
might be made consistent. The KBs consist of rules expressed 'in terms of ob'ect,
attribute, and value triples that supply a topology of relationships between the con-
cepts. CARTER's knowledge lies in detecting specific kinds of discrepancies and linking
them wth one or more potential resolutions.
As an example, 'Imagine that two wine experts, Kevin and Mary, have each con-
structed a KB that recommends a specific wne to go with dinner, and now wish to
create a single, consensus KB. Among the discrepancies they might encounter are:
1. differences in the nature of the outcome: one expert may specify a wine grape
(e.g., Pinot-Blanc) while the other specifies both grape and vintage (e.g., Pinot-
Blanc 83).
2. differences in vocabularies: one expert may refer to the body of the wne, while
the other refers to its robustness.
3. differences 'in pattern of inference: the experts may agree on the overall vocab-
ulary, but interconnect them differently, as for instance 'if one expert uses the
character of the meal spicy or bland) to help nfer which wine to select, while
the other relies on the category of the main dsh (e.g., meat or fish).
4. differences in the rules: the experts may agree on the vocabulary and intercon-
nection between terms, but suggest different specific values, as for instance 'if
one expert reasons that a turkey dish suggests a white wine, while the other
reasons that a turkey dish suggests a rose wne. Both are reasoning from the
type of the main dsh to the color of wine, but come out with derent values.
CARTER's overall strategy 'is to attack these 'in the order given. This approach
is motivated by both the computational and negotiation character of the task. The
computational task faced by the system is one of matching two collections of rules
that are at one level simply directed graphs- any useful guidance about where to start
the matching process will vastly improve the system's chances of making intelligent
suggestions. Expressed in these terms, we anchor the search at the end of the graph,
trying first to match the outcomes, then working backwards, matching the nodes
connected to the outcome, and continuing to work backward from there. Starting
w'th the outcome is sensible because it relies on the heuristic that two KBs about the
same topic are likely to have the same attribute as their goal
Starting with the outcome 'is also sensible from the negotiation point of vew it
is difficult to magine an effective discussion about the details f the two knowledge
bases are trying to arrive at different kinds of conclusions.
Figure 2 shows the beginning of this process. CARTER starts by determining the
goal of each KB a simple task snce it is by definition the sole attribute that appears
I'MOOMOR Imm"I" i - A 
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only 'in the conclusions of rules (i.e., it is 'Inferred by rules but nothing further is
inferred from it). CARTER identifies Kevin's goal as wine-region and Mary's as
wine-name.
Expert 1, what is your name? KEVIN
Expert 2 what is your name? MARY
KEVIN and MARY, the first thing I want to do is get some basic
agreement on what the goal of the consensus KB should be. I am
analyzing your individual KB's in an attempt to match them up.
OK. Here are the results of my analysis.
KEVIN has goal WINE-REGION
MARY has goal WINE-NAME
Figure 2 Identifying goals.
The system's next task 'is to decide as best it can whether these two things
represent identical concepts. The judgment about the real meaning of these two
terms can only come from the experts, but the system can make a surprisingly good
guess by examining three kinds of circumstantial evidence available in the knowledge
base:
9 Are the concept labels the same? In this case they are not (wine-region vs.
wine-name), but this can of course be an artifact of name-choice or (in other
circumstances) variations in spelling or abbreviation. Conversely, a match in
labels is useful evidence but no guarantee of match in meaning.
0 In the case of attributes, are the values the same? Once again here the answer
is no (e.g., calif ornia, rhone, etc., vs. chablis, gamay etc.).
* Are they 'Inferred from the same concepts and are they 'in turn used to infer the
same concepts? That is, do the occupy similar places in the topology of the
knowledge base? Once again in this case the answer is no.
Note that the last form of evidence makes the -process recursive: to determine
whether two concepts in the conclusion of a rule are the same, we need to determine
whether the concepts mentioned in the premise are the same, thereby starting the
process all over again with the premise concepts.
Figure 3 Matching goals.
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Weighing the evidence in the case at hand Figure 3 CARTER concludes that
wine-region and wine-name are not identical concepts. In response t tries a differ-
ent tactic invoking the heuristic that the goal attribute of one KB mght be found
on the route to the goal attribute of the other KB. That is, since the two endpoints
in the graphs do not match, perhaps the endpoint 'in one matches with one of the
intermediate points (conclusions) in the other. To explore this possibility, CARTER
tries to match wine-region of Kevin's KB (KKB) with the attributes that deter-
mine wine-name of Mary's KB (MKB), using the same criteria of label, value, and
topological correspondence.
As it turns out, this too fails, so CARTER tries 'it the other way around, attempting
to match wine-name of MKI3 wth the attributes determining wine-region in KKI3.
One of these attributes, wine-grape, happens to match rather well with wine-name.
Although their names are not the same, they share eght dfferent values, along with
three attributes used to determine them. This 'is strong evidence that wine-grape
and wine-name are the same concepts.
I'm afraid these goals do not match.
Also, KEVIN's goal doesn't match up with any concepts in MARY's KB.
However, MARY'S goal does seem to correspond to an attribute
determining KEVIN's goal, in particular, WINE-GRAPE, because
The domain of WINE-GRAPE f KEVIN's KB and
the domain of WINE-NAME of MARY's KB match up:
Values in common are: CHABLIS CHARDONNAY CHENIN-BLANC RIESLING
GAMAY PINOT-NOIR ZINFANDEL SAUVIONON-BLANC
Values only KEVIN has are.- PINOT-GRIS SEMILLION NAPA-OAMAY
PINOT-BLANC
Values only MARY has are: BURGUNDY VALPOLICELLA SOAVE.
In addition,
WINE-COLOR, WINE-SWEETNESS, and WINE-BODY of KEVIN's KB, which
determine WINE-GRAPE, match with
WINE-RECOMMENDEDCOLOR, WIXE-RtCOMMEDEDSWEETNESS, and
WINE-RECOMMENDEDBODY of MARY21' KB' which determine WINE-NAME.
Therefore, it would seem that WINE-REGION is the result of an extra
operation on the data KEVIN's KB'performs that MARY's KB does not.
Mary's Knowledge Base-, WINE-NAME
4
Kevin's Knowledge Base: WINE-GRAPE WINE-REGION
Figure 4 Aligning the two KBs.
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I recommend that you do the following to reach agreement on the
goals of the consensus KB.
First, decide whether WINE-REGION should be included in the
consensus KB.
5 CARTER 10
The strong match between wine-grape and wine-name enables CARTER to pro-
pose a specific diagnosis about the specific discrepancy between the two KBs. Since
(Figures 3 and 4 wine-name, the goal attribute of MKB, seems to match the concept
wine-grape, a concept on the route to the goal of KKB, CARTER concludes that
wine-region is a concept that reflects an additional inference that only Kevin's KB
performs, thereby providing a more specific recommendation (not just a wine grape, 
a grape grown in a particular region).
Now that CARTER has analyzed the discrepancy, it can propose a plan to reconcile
it Figure 5). One of the repair actions suggests that, when one KB has an attribute
the other lacks, the discrepancy can be resolved either by adding the attribute to one
KB or deleting it from the other. That is, the experts need to decide whether the
consensus KB should use the extra attribute.
If so, MARY adds the WINE-REGION attribute to her KB
anew set of rules fr determining WINE'REGION.
If not, KEVIN deletes the WINE-REGION attribute from
consolidate the attributes WINt-GRAPE and WTNE-NAME.
Do you approve of this plan? Y
Figure 5: The repair plan.
and generates
his KB, and we
At this point, cARTER asks the experts decide. Whatever the outcome, there
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is additional work to do. Since wine-name and wine-grape are the same underly-
ing concept, they must be reconciled. In addition, if the experts decide to include
wine-region in the consensus KB, Mary must provide her version of the rules that
take the additional 'Inference step, determining wine-region from wine-name then
those rules must be compared with Kevin's and any discrepancy resolved.
The experts indicate this plan as reasonable. CARTER then provides information
about wine-region to assist them (Figure 6, and after some discussion, the experts
choose not to 'Include 'It. It is deleted from B.
Here is some information on WINE-REGION:
Attribute name: WINE-REGION
KB's found in: KEVIN'S
Possible values: CALIFORNIA RHONE RED-BURGUNDY ST-EMILLION 8AUjOLAI8
RED-BURGUNDY W14ITE-BURGUNDY COTES-DU-RHONE
Objects attribute affects: None
Attributes determined by: WINE-GRAPE WINE-COLOR
Now, given this information, do you wish to retain WINE-REGION for
the consensus KB? (Take all the time you want to discuss it) N
OK. I'll delete WINE-REGION from KEVIN'S KB now, OK? Y
WINE-REGION deleted.
Figure 6 Resolving the discrepancy
As 'Indicated by the plan CARTER supplied, the next task is to consolidate wine-grape
and wine-name. Once again CARTER knows about this kind of discrepancy and how
to resolve it: the experts should choose a shared attribute name and agree on a con-
solidated list of values for the attribute (Figure 7). The experts choose wine-type as
the shared term.
Next, I am going to try to help you consolidate WINE-GRAPE and
WINE-NAME.
Given how they match up, are WINE-GRAPE and WINE-NAME the same
concept? Y
What do you two want to call this concept? WINE-TYPE
Fine. I will change the names.
Figure 7 Consolidating two concepts.
Reconciling the values is more involved, since we are not sure how the mismatched
values correspond. CARTER tries to solve the problem by using the topology of the
KBs to attempt to match the values. As with attribute labels, if two values wth
different labels are linked to other values that do correspond (i.e., they have the same
label), the ifferent labels may 'in fact be referring to the same underlying concept.
The heuristic here is that rules with similar premises typically have similar conclusions
and that the apparent dfference in conclusions can arise smply because the experts
are using different names (or varying spelling) for the same concept.
To test this theory, CARTER retrieves the rules that determine wine-type 'in both
KBs and picks out those with 'Identical premise value labels but dffering conclusions
(Figure 8). This process picks out pinot-gris in KKB and soave in MKB, because
they are both inferred by rules that reason from a wne whose sweetness 'is dry, and
whose color 'is white.
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Now, let's establish the consensus values for WINE-TYPE.
So far, we have the following set of consensus values.-
CHABLIS CHARDONNAY CHENIN-BLANC RIESLING GAMAY PINOT-NOIR ZINFANDEL
SAUVIGNON-BLANC
Values still to be accounted for are
PINOT-GRIS SEMILLION NAPA-GAMAY PINOT-BLANC in KEVIN's KB and
BURGUNDY VALPOLICELLA SOAVE 'in MARY's KB.
Some of these values may be corresponding concepts with different
labels; others may needed to be added to or deleted from the
consensus KB.
Would you like some suggestions about how the labels might
correspond? Y
PINOT-GRIS may correspond to SOAVE since they both appear in similar
rules:
KEVIN's KB MARY's KB
IF WINE-COLOR is WHITE and IF WINE-RECOMMENDEDCOLOR is WHITE and
WINE-SWEETNESS is DRY WINE-RtCOMMENDEDSWEETNtSS i's DRY
THEN WINE-TYPE is PINOT-GRIS THEN WINE-TYPt 'is SAVE
Are PINOT-GRIS and SOAVE two different names for the same concept? N
Ok.
I have no further suggestions for how any of the unmatched values
might correspond.
The possible correspondences are-
1) different names for the same concept
2) different concepts that should be added to the consensus KB
3) different concepts that should be deleted from the consensus KB.
Please indicate which category each value belongs in, and I'll help you
make the necessary changes.
5 CARTER 13
Figure 8: Attempting to match values.
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I i -grisAs t turns out 7 n this case the strategy fails, snce pinot nd soave are in
fact different types of wine. At this point CARTER has run out of useful suggestions
about how to pair off the unmatched values in each knowledge base. Some of the
other values may correspond, but CARTER cannot detect them because the experts
have named them differently and used different premises to conclude them. The
remaining non-shared values are smply missing from one of the knowledge bases.
The system now offers one final pece of assistance, informing the experts of the kinds
of discrepancies that can occur accidental naming mismatches and genuine dfferences
in the coverage of each KB), and asks them to determine the correct analysis for each
of the non-shared values.
After reaching agreement on the goal for the consensus knowledge base, the sys-
tem then retrieves the attributes that determine the goal in each of the 'Individual
KBs and uses the techniques just 'Illustrated to get agreement on these attributes.
Once the system has agreement on these related attributes, 'it begins to detect and
remove incompleteness and inconsistency 'in the rules that link them. Figure 9 shows
an example of resolving two nconsistent rules: two rules with 'identical premises but
different conclusions.
Now,, let's try to get agreement on the rules determining WINE-COLOR.
I have noticed the following discrepancy:
KEVIN's KB MARY's KB
IF ENTREE-NAME is TURKEY IF ENTREE-NAME is TURKEY
THEN WINE-COLOR 'is WHITE THEN WINE-COLOR is ROSE
Since you two have already discussed the vocabulary involved here, I
am pretty sure this problem is not due to a failure to consolidate
WHITE and ROSE, or a misunderstanding about the meaning of
ENTREE-NAME or WINE-COLOR.
Would you like to include both of these rles in the consensus
KB? N
Figure 9: Detecting and analyzing inconsistent rules.
CARTER knows three ways 'in which this can happen:
1 a misunderstanding about the vocabulary: white and rose could be synonyms.
--- -mol I
5 CARTER 15
This is ruled out because the experts have already agreed on the vocabulary.
2. there 'is not really a mismatch because both rules should be 'in both knowledge
bases (each expert forgot one rule that the other remembered).
CARTER offers them this option, but they decline.
3. both rules are over-generalized as stated: they are both mssing an attribute
whose value constitutes an 'Important unstated assumption that the experts
know but forgot to make explicit.
When CARTER inquires about this last possibility (Figure 10), the experts agree
that they omitted information about the entree-sauce. When they elaborate their
rules to include this, we dscover that they had different assumptions about the cor-
responding value, so the rules are 'in fact mutually compatible and the experts agree
that they should both be included 'in the consensus KB. The process continues with
the system guiding the experts in resolving remaining details about the new attribute
entree-sauce.
In that case, let me propose another solution.
It is possible that you two are making different assumptions about
some other attribute which is important for determining the
conclusion of the rule, but that neither of you have included in
your KB. Take a moment to think about and discuss what other
factors might be important in determining WINE-COLOR.
Can you think of any other f actors? Y
What do you want to call this factor? ENTREE-SAUCE
OK. KEVIN, what value for ENTREE-SAUCE did you have in mind when
you wrote your rule? NONE
MARY, what value for ENTREE-SAUCE dd you have in mind when you
wrote your rule? SWEET
If we included ENTREE-SAUCE in the two rules, they would look like
this:
KEVIN's KB MARY's KB
IF ENTREE-NAME is TURKEY and IF ENTREE-NAME is TURKEY and
ENTREE-SAUCE is NONE ENTREE-SAUCE is SWEET
THEN WINE-COLOR is WHITE THEN WINE-COLOR is ROSE
Are both of you willing to include both of these rules in the
consensus KB? Y
Great! Now, to complete the repair process we have to determine
the set of consensus values for ENTREE-SAUCE, and add it into the
other rules linking ENTREE-NAME ad'PNTREE-SAUCE to WINE-COLOR as
appropriate. Then, we can go to work on the discrepancies which
arise in these modified rules.
Figure 10: Resolving the difference.
-1- 
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5.2 CATALOGING DISCREPANCY KNOWLEDGE
CARTER's expertise lies 'in recognizing and repairing a variety of discrepancies. This
knowledge is organized in a catalog currently containing ten entries, each of which
consists of a discrepancy detection procedure and a corresponding set of resolution
procedures. This simple, detection-resolution style organization of the catalog makes
'it easier to add new entries as we gain more experience with consensus knowledge
acquisition.
To determine the kinds of discrepancies we n ded to cover we systematically
compared a number of KBs at three dfferent levels of abstraction. Viewing a knowl-
edge base as a functional relationship leads us to focus on inputs (test data) and
outputs (the generated recommendations). Viewing it in terms of individual rules
centers on the detailed relationships between attribute-object-value triples. Those
triples in turn define the vocabulary of the experts. Studying KBs from each of
these three points of view gives us some assurance that we have achieved reasonable
coverage of the set of possible discrepancies.
We also found that discrepancies can be resolved through four general mecha-
I incorpo
nisms that cut across these levels of abstraction: 0) negation, ) ration (ii)
compromise, and (I'v) elaboration. Negation suggests that one expert should change
something to remove a defect in his knowledge base, when the other expert convinces
him that one of his judgments is incorrect. Incorporation suggests that one expert
should add something to his KB that the other already has (or conversely that the
other expert should remove it). This is useful when one KB has an 'incomplete set
of ob'ects rules or test cases (or the other KB has extraneous objects, rules, or test
cases). Figure 6 provides an illustration with the deletion of wine-region.
Compromise suggests that both experts change their KBs. It is helpful when the
experts wish to establish a shared vocabulary or negotiate an intermediate settlement.
One example is the decision to use wine-type as the shared name in Fgure 7.
Elaboration suggests that both experts add something to the KBs to remove
discrepancies not otherwise resolvable. It 'is needed when a problem is not localizable
in ether KB individually, as when entree-sauce had to be added in Fgure 10.
The discrepancy catalog is a domain-independent source of knowledge that sys-
temizes our approach to CKA. We can account for the differences between KBs in
terms of the catalog entries and attempt to remove them through an associated resolu-
tion mechanism. The result is a tool for partitioning the CKA problem and supporting
the solution of each of the subproblems.
6 RELATED'WORK
Two previous efforts are smilar in general spirit to ours. A previous use of debugging
in this general area 'is the Delphi technique (Helmer and Rescher, 1959; Jagannathan
and Elmaghraby,1985), used to achieve consensus among a group of experts on a
specific issue. It is a three-step, iterative process involving, (i) submitting individual
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opinions and their supporting reasoning to a skilled facilitator, (ii) preparation of
a summary report by the facilitator, and (iii) forwarding of the report back to the
experts. Here the facilitator plays a role 'in debugging by attempting to clarify the
specific areas of disagreement among the experts. Although entirely manual, this role
demonstrates one possible activity of a CKA debugging program, that of "setting the
agenda" for dscussion between experts.
More recently, work by Boose 1986) and Plaza et al. 1987) has been focused
on using knowledge of multiple experts. They concentrate for the most part on a
number of schemes for using the knowledge rather than resolving discrepancies. They
suggest combining expertise smply by adding both experts knowledge to a single
knowledge base, tagging each rule wth 'Its author, and then allowing a number of
basic strategies. In one case the user simply has to decide which expert to believe,
in another the user can weight the experts' opinions etc. The guidance they do oer
in reaching consensus on the knowledge is relatively modest. They proceed from the
repertory grid notion (Kelly, 1955) that underlies their work and suggest that all
the vocabulary terms used by each expert individually to construct his own grid be
combined to form a single, larger vocabulary that will then be used by each expert
to construct a new grid. They acknowledge that the experts may be unfamiliar with
each other's terms and "may have to 'guess' what was meant" when they encounter
an unfamiliar term in the grid.
Another recent study (Klein et al., 1989) addresses the 'issue of resolving con-
flicting design specifications. Through direct observation of architects cooperatively
developing a design for a house, they developed a conflict class herarchy for identi-
fying and resolving differences, between design alternatives. Although this typology
of conflicts is similar in some respects to our discrepancy catalog, one important dif-
ference is in the content: their primary focus 'is on reconciling the designs themselves
rather than design knowledge.
7 CONTRIBUTIONS, EXTENSIONS, LIMITATIONS
The primary contribution of this work is the store of detailed information we have
codified for facilitating CKA. It represents a small but growing and relatively system-
atic expression of knowledge that was previously 'Informal, experiential, and largely
tacit.
A second contribution arises from the surprisingly effective degree of bootstrap-
ping the system displays. The system must make its best guess about the meaning
of a term from the way 'it is used in a knowledge base, it can gather only circum-
stantial evidence of the sort we reviewed above, and 'it must, paradoxically, gather
that evidence from the very same knowledge bases it is attempting to modify to reach
consensus. It it thus striking how effective the system's heuristics are at guiding 'it,
allowing it to make lausible judgments about which concepts match and so that even
when it has to ask the experts, the questions are for the most part sensible and well
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chosen.
A third contribution is the role of our work as a general model for construct-
ing systems that detect and resolve knowledge-level discrepancies. While our current
system removes discrepancies 'in rules and attribute-object-value triples, we believe
debugging and repair strategies can equally well be organized around other kinds of
knowledge structures, including decision trees, frames, and database schemas. The
fundamental process involves three steps: identify the various elements of the repre-
sentation (e.g., alternatives, events, payoffs, probabilities), develop a taxonomy of how
the representations can differ across these elements (e.g., one expert has an additional
alternative), and finally prescribe possible resolutions for each of these discrepancies
(e.g., one expert has to add an alternative). The three resolution mechanisms de-
scribed above may provide additional guidance in this last step.
The fourth contribution is the ality of the debugging approach to support
the early phase of CKA. Recall that the other techniques for reconciling multiple
experts-combination and argumentation-are most effective only after we have es-
tablished that a conflict exists and that 'it 'is dfficult or impossible to resolve. Our
technique is useful 'in the 'Important previous stage when we are still trying to make
sense of how the KBs compare. It would be unwise for experts to argue about their
differing positions before they had established that a real conflict existed. The size
of the discrepancy catalog suggests that 'it is surprising how many inconsistencies are
reconcilable without resorting to argument or outcome combination methods.
7.1 Future Work
Although the discrepancy catalog 'is an important and effective first step, considerable
work remains. One of the most 'Important areas for future research is the question of
discrepancy resolution strategy. While the strategy discussed in Section 5.1 starting
at the outcome and working backward) is very useful, it is only one of many possi-
bilities. One problem 'is that this may be a bit too myopic to be effective in a large
scale knowledge base. The system in effect 'Immediately dives into the details and its
needs a better sense of the larger picture. Our next task 'is thus to generate a number
of strategies and evaluate them 'in terms of (i) the efficiency and effectiveness wth
which they increase the degree of consensus, and (ii) the naturalness and coherence
of the dialogues they produce.
We will 'Investigate strategies organized around two kinds of approaches. The first
approach relies on systematic traversal of the KB. One example of this was illustrated
earlier (working backward from the goal); we intend to examine two others that are
also likely to be effective: forward from inputs and working in both directions from
any agreed on point. We expect that working forward from inputs should be effective
on the grounds that the two KBs are likely to work from the same basic 'Information.
We believe that begining at an intermediate point of agreement and expanding in
both directions will exploit the strategy of emphasizing what the experts already
agree on and building from this foundation.
---- -- - -l-------- - I .m 
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The other approach 'Involves assigning a score to each dscrepancy based on its
severity (how dssimilar the two concepts are), the value of resolving it (how much
resolution would increase the degree of consensus), and the likelihood that it will
not be resolved through the removal of another discrepancy (e.g., when the resolu-
tion of an attribute discrepancy reconciles their corresponding rules). The system's
choice of discrepancy could then be guided by a h'll-climbing strategy, always choos-
ing the discrepancy with the highest score. Another form of guidance can be supplied
by precedence relationships between both knowledge base elements (e.g., attributes
should be resolved before rules) and resolution mechanisms (e.g., attempt incorpo-
ration before elaboration). Thus far we have 'Implemented scores based on severity,
determining which attributes to match up next.
Several other extensions to the system may also be desirable. First, additional
knowledge, not available from the structure of the KBs themselves, will likely provide
the system with additional power. Clancey 1986), for example, notes that many
current rule-based systems employ a problem solving technique called structured se-
lection, characterized by abstracting from specific data (e.g., classifying a patient
based on patient data), followed by heuristic matching associating a patient class
to a disease), and then solution refinement refining from disease category to spe-
cific disease). Each of these three subtasks is carried out by different sets of rules.
If CARTER could determine which rules belonged to each subtask, it could use this
knowledge to characterize discrepancies more precisely and organize its presentation
of choices to the expert. It would as a result be using knowledge about the character
of the task (structured selection), in addition to its existing knowledge about rules,
attribute-object-value triples, etc.
Second, for the cases 'in which debugging alone fails to result in a consensus KB, 'it
would be helpful to give CARTER the ability to support formal argumentation between
the experts or suggest resolutions based on combination methods (e.g., averaging
certainty factors). Finall , we might streamline the resolution process as in the
y 7
instances 'in which the 'incrementalist of the debugging approach is 'Inefficient. For
example, the system may prescribe a number of isolated modifications to the KBs
when 'it would be easier smply to redo an entire section all at once. It would be nce
to be able to recognize such situations.
The bootstrapping nature of the system has substantial 'Implications for 'Its perfor-
mance. In general, the more any bootstrapping program knows, the more eectively
it can perform, and conversely. CARTER will perform well when a large number of
similarities exist from which to gain a foothold, but will degrade significantly when
few are found. Seemingly trivial differences like different abbreviations 'in the labels
used for values can make matching very dfficult.
Our attempt to discern meaning of terms by bootstrapping from the existing
knowledge base can also run into trouble in circumstances that are unusual, but not
impossible. The question of whether two concepts mean the same thing is in fact deep
and in general extremely difficult to answer wth assurance. Even the best human
-11 "P.Op" .--- -
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mediator working with two cooperative experts may find out only after considerable
time has elapsed that two terms thought to be synonymous in fact had importantly
different shades of meaning. The best we can do here 'is accumulate all available
circumstantial evidence and use 'it 'in the most effective order comparing names,
values, and topology, then eventually asking the experts). In doing so we reduce the
chance of being misled, but must remain aware of the possibility of 'it happening.
8 CONCLUSION
We have described a novel approach to and prototype system for facilitating consensus
knowledge acquisition. The key contributions of this work 'Include the development of
a detailed store of knowledge for detecting and resolving discrepancies in rule-based
systems and a general procedure for developing similar systems for other representa-
tions. We expect the next advance 'in this area to come from implementing improved
discrepancy resolution strategies. This work will serve as the starting point for under-
standing more generally how experts reach consensus and how we can best support
them in their efforts to do so.
"Nomp I m4mm" I 
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